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Summary
The dilemma faeing new demoeraeies attempting to
implement politieal and eeonomie reform simultaneously is
that demoeratisation may undermine eeonomie reform by
eneouraging politieal partieipation and empowering interest
groups that are unlikely to benefit from reform. This paper
eompares interest group - government relations under one-
party and multiparty rule in Zambia. Contrary to the
assumptions of pluralist theory, the paper argues that the
influenee of interest groups declined as a result of politieal
and eeonomie liberalisation. The evolution of eleetoral
polities resulted in the proliferation of eivie assoeiations and
the weakening of eorporatist links between the state and
eeonomie interest groups that had been granted some real
influenee in the previous authoritarian regime. This 'pluralist
paradox' has meant, at least in the initial phases of multi party
ru le, that interest group resistanee do not eonstitute a
signifieant threat to the sustainability of the reform
programme, nor the eleetoral prospeets of MMD.
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Part 1: Introduction1
Political liberalisation is expected to lea d to greater pluralism as new freedoms
for associations willead to a rise in the number of societal groups and new
freedoms of speech wil ensure that they have a voice. Over time, this is
expected to create problems for a government wishing to maintain economic
reforms, since they need to maintain political support to be re-elected and
since we know that the electorate does not like to en dure difficult economic
restructuring, such as cuts in government spending. This is the dilemma facing
new democracies attempting to implement political and economic reform
simultaneously. Assuming that democratisation, at lea st temporarily, may
undermine economic reform by encouraging political participation and
empowering interest groups that are unlikely to benefit from reform, the
academic and aid-related literature has over the past three decades presented
various theoretical formulas to overcome this dilemma.
As one of the first countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Zambia embarked
on a proeess of simultaneously implementingpolitical and economic reforms
in 1991. The Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), a coalition of
trade unions, business' interests and intellectuals, won an overwhelming
electoral victory over the single party for the pa st 17 years, United National
Independence Party (UNIP). In the electoral campaign MMD committed itself
to an ambitious economic reform programme. The peaceful transition to
multiparty rule and the economic policies promoted by the new government
made Zambia a 'model for Africa', both in the eyes of the international
donors and much of the academic community (Bonnick 1997; Bratton 1992;
Joseph 1992).
In November 1996 the second parliamentary and presidential elections
were held within the multiparty constitution. Contrary to the experiences of
the 1980s, the economic reform proeess begun in the early 1990s was not
revers ed as the MMD government approached the 1996 elections. The
elections were carried out in a situation of economic decline. Despite five years
of continuous economic reform, the record was exceedingly complex and
mixed. On the one hand a foundation was laid for a shift from a state
oriented to a mark et based economy. Despite several exogenous shocks and
uneven implementation, non e of the reform measures implemented in the
1990s were reversed. On the other hand, several key reforms were not
implemented including civil service reform and the privatisation of the copper
industry.2 Partly as a result of uneven implementation, the Zambian economy
did not experienceany growth in the 1990s and from late 1993 onwards, the
economic restructuring measures were criticised by interest groups, NGOs and
opposition parties. Despite this, no opposition party offered an alternative to
continued economic restructuring in their1996 election campaigns. MMD
was granted another five year term in office with an electoral majority
comparable to the 1991 victory. The 1996 elections were considered flawed
lAuthor's note: An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1999 African Studies
Association Meeting in Philadelphia. I thank Deborah Brautigam, Nicolas van de Walle, Arne
Tostensen, Linda Cotton and David Simon for comments.2 An agreement for the sale of Zambia Consolidated Coppermines (ZCCM) was finalised in
November 1999.
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by many observers. The conduct of the elections proved that the Chiluba
government was wiling to compromise the rule of law and to exploit its
majority position and controlover government resources to maintain power.
As evidence of democratie consolidation, these elections were, therefore,
deficient. Nevertheless, based on electoral results and post-election surveys,
observers have argued that the 1996 elections served as an indication of
MMD's ability to convince voters that it should be granted an other five year
term due to its successes in market liberalisation, transport and healthcare
reform (Bratton and Posner 1999: 400).
This paper compares the relationship between the key interest groups
representing agriculture, business and labour and government firstly, under
one party rule in the 1980s and secondly, under multiparty rule in the 1990s.
Contrary to the assumptions of pluralist theory, the paper argues that the
influence of economic interest groups declined as a result of the combined
effects of political and economic liberalisation. An immediate effect of
economic restructuring was that the associations representing business, labour
and agriculture experienced a decline in their membership. More surprisingly
perhaps, the Zambian case indicates that the proeess of political liberalisation
further reduced the influence of these associations. The creation of a large
number of non-governmental organisations and 36 new opposition parties
meant that interest groups representing labour, agriculture and business found
it increasingly more difficult to be seen and heard in public fora which again
reduced their ability to influence government. The associations' weakness in
terms of membership density further reduced the governments incentive for
consulting with, or yield to the interests of, these associations as they did not
represent a significant electoral base. Thus, whereas politicalliberalisation re-
introduced multiparty elections and civic liberties to Zambia, the proeess of
political reform did not result in increased participation by interest groups in
terms these groups' enhanced capacity to influence economic policy. Due to
this 'pluralist paradox', the position of interest groups did not constitute a
significant threat to the sustainability of the economIc reform programme, or
the electoral prospects of MMD.
The paper is organised in the following manner: Proceeding this
introduction, part two discusses recent developments in the theoretical
literature on the relationship between political and economic proeesses of
reform. Part three analyses the relationship between the government and
economic interest groups representing agriculture, business and labour in the
one-party state. Part four asesses the relationship between interest groups and
the MMD government in Zambia's Third Republic (1991-). The concluding
section addresses the implications of the pluralist paradox witnessed in the
first decade of Zambia's multiparty democracy.
Part 2: The relationship between political and economic
proeesses of reform
Do proeesses of political and economic reform interrelate? To what extent are
democracies or authoritarian systems better equipped to undertake economic
reforms intended to secure growth? These broad questions of research have
always occupied political scientists and the role of interest groups have
aquired a central place within this debate.
2
The authoritarian phase
When an economic crisis unfolded in Latin America and Africa in the late
1970s, structural adjustment programmes were introduced by the
International Finanee Institutions and the issue of economic liberalisation was
brought to the centre of academic attention. At this stage, democratie regimes
were of ten deemed less able to undertake economic reforms than authoritarian
ones (Lal 1983; Nelson 1990). The argument in favour of state autonomy
when implementing structural adjustment reform was based in logic of
collective action reasoning; gains of reform were considered to be defused and
spread across a wide proportion of the population while the costs of the
reforms were expected to fall on powerful constituents that had been the main
beneficiaries of state intervention in the former economy. Thus, losers from
reform were expected to solve the collective action problem by organising
against the reforms even if their numeric size was inferior to the potential
winning coalition (Haggard and Kaufman 1989). Based within this reasoning,
authoritarian regimes appeared more able to insulate themselves from interest
gro up pressure and this form of state autonomy was by many observers
deemed necessary for reforms (Kaufman 1985). As the decade progressed,
however, increasingly comparative research began to call the negative
correlation betweeneconomic reform and democratisation intoquestion. A
number of new studies sugge sted that not only were manyauthoritarian
regimes incapable of dealing with economic crisis, but also that many
democratie regimes had capacity to do so (Remmer 1990; Bresser Pereia;
Marawalland Przeworski 1993).
The 'dual reform' perspective
After close to a decade of poor economic results and increasing internal
opposition against corruption and the bad economic practices of many
authoritarian regimes, a new focus on political and economic liberalisation
emerged which assigned a vital role to civil societyassociations (Landell-Mils
1992: Johnston et aL. 1993). Acknowledging both the changing political
climate and the inconclusive evidence generated from comparative research, a
new consensus emerged in the 1990s arguing that economic and political
reforms could well be implemented simultaneously (Haggard and Webb
1994). Toward the late 1980s aid bureaucrats and policy makers began to
argue that political reforms in fact was a necessary component for the
realisation of economic growth through reform.
One of the main differences between the authoritarian argument and the
new perspective, of ten referred to as the dual reform perspective, related to the
role of interest groups in decision-making. The authoritarian perspective held
interest group participation to be a hindranee for growth oriented reform
policies. The new theories emerging in the early 1990s as signe d a vital ro le to
interest associations in order to achieve both economic growth and democratie
sustainability. Within this perspective it was held that greater participation
and involvement by affected social groups in policy making would ensure
ownership, credibility and sustainability of the reform proeesses. Thus, the
strengthening of the democratie proeesses and, with it, corporatist arrange-
ments between groups and the political elite, was expected to secure economic
reform proeesses. Rather than an obstacle, interest groups increasingly became
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considered a vital channel of communIcation between the state and society
(Robinson 1995). Arguably, however, in much of the theoretical literature, the
potential dilemmas associated with interest gro up activity were still present.
According to the dual transition literature appearing from the early 1990s
onwards, the main challenge for transitional governments attempting to
implement political and economic reform simultaneously was to achieve a
balanee between, on the one hand, meeting popiilar demands and, on the
other hand, implementing market based reforms which spelt hardship and
sacrifice (Haggard and Webb 1994; Nelson 1994; Bates and Krueger 1993).
Increasingly scholars stressed the need to create constituencies of support for
the economic reform measures. Joan Nelson characterised interest groups as
'janus faced'; from one perspective they were part of the fundamental core of
democratie practIce exercising voice and forming alliances. However, interest
groups could als o produee disastrous policies and threaten the ability of
governments to make decisions (Nelson 1994: 150). Thus, the central
question became how to initiate a proeess of reform in the face of reform
resistant interest groups. If reforms could be implemented and sustained it was
hypothesised that supportive coalitions would emerge. Perceiving themselves
as beneficiaries of the economic reform measures, these groups could in turn
provide the new democratie regimes with electoral support in up-coming
elections. The dilemma of political and economic reform implementation
could therefore be considered temporary.
Both the authoritarian perspective dominating the debate until the mid
1980s and the dual reform perspective which became dominant in the 1990s
share a common conviction that interest group influence is potentially harmful
for economic reform proeesses and further, that the interests of formal interest
associations wil be enhanced by the introduction of liberal political reforms.
However, research in different empirical settings have recently begun to
question the assumption that every country undergoing structural adjustment
has to cope with a politically aroused anti reform civil society.
Interest groups do not matter - in faet they never did
Basing their conclusions on comparative studies of reform implementation in
eighth developing countries, Bates and Krueger find that organisations
representing business and labour, perceiving reforms as potentially harmful to
their interests, rarely were able to block reform:
"One of the most surprising fin dings of our case studies is the degree to which the
intervention of interest groups fails to account for the initiation, or lack of initiation,
of policy reform" (Bates and Krueger 1993: 455).3
Barbara Geddes' research based in Latin America paints a similar picture of
passive or ineffectual civil society organisations. She finds that groups that
have born the co st of reforms, especially organised urban labour groups, have
shown less capacity to exert political influence than observers expected. Based
on these observations Geddes criticises the prevailing theoretical perspectives
3 However, as pointed to by van de Walle, while arguing thatinterest groups have little impact
on the likelihood of reform, interest groups are throughout the study assumed to have a
powerful impact on decision-making (van de Walle 1999).
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for its singular focus on interest groups and classes without regard to the ways
in which political arrangements affect whether or not interest groups are
influential or not. Instead her research suggests that the groups with the best
ability topostpone or stall proeesses of reform are located within the
government and the bureaucracy (Geddes 1994, 1995).
Supporting this perspective, but based on African empirical evidence,
van de Walle rejects the notion of interest groups in society blocking reform
due to the continents weak societal organisations and dominant, yet weak,
central states. According to van de Walle, if interest groups were the main
impediments to reform, policy reform should have advanced the furthest in
Africa due to the continents weak socIetal groups, but this is far from the case
(van de Walle 1999). Walle locates the main obstacles to sustained economic
reform within the state itself and the political institutions that link state and
socIety. Finding that continuity rather than change is the main factor that
needs explaining in Africa's political reform proeesses, Bratton and van de
Walle ascribe the continuity to the deeply ingrained, yet informal, institutions
of neopatrimonialism. In their view, the strong African tradition of rule by
individuals throughpersonal pre stige and power has managed to
accommodate itself to the economic and political changes. Interestingly,
similar conclusions appearfrom Latin American and Eastern European cases
studies (Hellman 1998; Gibson 1997). These studies have indicated that the
politics of populism can be maintained while pursuing zealous economic
liberalisation programmes.
The recent critique of the interest group perspective provokes debate on
well established positions and points to important empirical shortcomings in
the former models. The proceeding discussion wil show that the Zambian
case study supports the claim that interest groups only to a limited degree
have shaped the reform proeesses within the multiparty constitution.
However, deviating from the state centred arguments presented, the analysis
will indicate that the interest group perspective was essentially correct when
emphasising interest group resistance as a major obstacle to reform under the
one-party rule. The paradox in the case of Zambia is that due to a
combination of ideology, economic development objectives and the one-party
state structure, formal interest groups were granted some real influence in the
former one party regime. The transition to pluralist policies sp elt an end to
UNIP's humanist-cum-socialist ideology that had guided state society relations
in the post-colonial era. Ironically, the weakly institutionalised formal system
of democratie rule implemented by MMD in 1991 has served to weaken the
influence of formal interest groups.
Part 3: Economic interestgroups under one-party rule
From the time of independence UNIP and President Kaunda sought to create a
political system which enhanced the nationalist sentiments from the
independence struggle. Due to the incomes genera te d from the coppermines,
the nationalist government was able to implement a wide range of social
services. As a result, a widesupport base involving economic interest groups,
the party and the civil service was created through redistribution of benefits to
major social groups (Scott 1980). A proeess of nationalisation of all major
sectors of the economy was begun in the mid-1960s. The aim to 'Zambianise'
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all sectors of political and economic life brought interest groups representing
labour, business and agriculture into a close, albeit conflictual, relationship
with the state. Nationalisation as a political ideology was legitimised by
reference to Kenneth Kaunda's philosophy of Humanism (Beveridge and
Oberschall 1979).4 Hawkins argues that the developmentalist state model,
shape d within the realm of Humanism, created a constituency for the
government among elements of society that could potentially threaten its
power in the urban population including urban elites and unionised workers
(Hawkins 1991).
The introduction of the one party state in 1972 brought Zambia close to
a system of statecorporatism as all interest groups were designated to belong
to the state and only non-political associations were allowed to register
outside UNIP.5 State corporatism in Zambia sought to merge the institutions
of the state with the party (UNIP) and interest organisations. These
constitutional changes greatly affected associationallife. As opposition parties
were banned in a con text of an increasingly more vocal political opposition, it
became necessary to establish a new consensus for the continuation of UNIP's
rule. According to many observers, this consensus was created through
extensive use of patronage. Due to the incomes generated from the
coppermines, the nationalist government was able to implement a wide range
of social services (Scott 198 O). As argued by Graham: "Access to the party
system and the state resources that it controlled became the primary route to
social advancementin post-independence Zambia" (Graham 1994: 152). This
form of state corporatist structures, nevertheless, created a space for interest
gro up polities.
The influence of labour under the ane party system
Due to its central location on the Copperbelt, UNIP sought to control the
urban work force throughout the post-colonial period. Ironically, UNIP's
attempt to incorporate interest associations to the party structure created a
financially and organisationally via ble opposition movement from a trade
union movement that was characterised by internal splits and a weak financial
situation at the time of independence. UNIP first sought to bring the trade
union movement in line with its own development objectives through
voluntary measures (Bates 1971). By 1970, the leve! of strike activity and
worker militarism indicated that this strategy had not been successful
(Meebelo 1986). The implementation of the Industrial Relations Act of 1971,
which introduced mandatory affiliation to one central union congress and a
policy of one-industry one union, should be seen in this light. The new IR
represented a clear break with voluntarism as it strengthened the powers of
the party and government through clauses regulating strike activity (Ibid). At
the same time the organisational monopoly and automatic check-off facilities
improved the financial situation of the Zambian trade union movement
4 The doctrine of Humanism was introduced by President Kaunda in 1967, the main points
were published in two booklets entitled Humanism I (1967) and Humanism Il (1974).5Whereas the Western European model of societal corporatism implies a voluntary relationship
between the state and interest groups, authoritarian regimes have of ten attempted to co-opt
associational life through structures of state corporatism (Schmitter, P. and G. Lembuch (eds.)
(1982).
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significantly (Simutanyi 1996). Instead of gaining controlover the unions
through state corporatist measures, ZCTU became the most powerful non-
state association in Zambia in the 1980s. In 1991 its membership of app.
350.000 workers comprised around 70 per cent of the total work force in
formal sector employment. The urban work force, organised through the
Zambia Congress of Trade Unions was both a political contestant to UNIP
and a threat to the governments economicdevelopment project. From the mid
1970s onwards, ZCTU became the main opposition force in Zambia. This
proeess culminated in 1990 when ZCTU lent its organisation structure to the
MMD and became a central force in the 1991political transition. As argued
by a UNIP party official in 1991 when it was dear that MMD had ousted
UNIP from power through utilising ZCTU's organisational resources:
"The part succeeded in creating a constitution which provided for unionship atall
leve Is, and the num ber of unions were reduced to 19 which made it possible to
group people into districts, which again became the nucleus of the ZCTU structure.
This was the aim ofUNIP, to create a strong and unified trade union movement and
now, it is the base for the MMD".6
Business interests under the ane party state
Whereas the creation of a unified and politically vibrant trade union
movement was an explicit political ambition of UNIP, its relationship to
business interests was far more ambivalent. Due to the limited opportunities
for Africans to enter into enterprise under the colonial administration, a
Zambian entrepreneurial class was created with the support of the state in the
post colonial period (Baylies and Szeftel 1982). According to Turok,
objections to state intervention by capitalist minded Zambians were largely
stilled as all classes wanted development and modernisation to proceed and it
was evident that the state had sufficient capital to set this in motion (Turok
1989). Zambian businessmen became beneficiaries of state intervention and
investments. The policy of state take-overs weakened the position of foreign
capital and stipulated that certain sectors and sea les of enterprises should be
reserved for African citizens (Baylies and Szeftel 1982: 69). Limited incentives
existed for business to be members of the two business associations existing at
the time, the Zambia National Council of Commerce and Industry (ZNCCI)
and the largely expatriate run Zambia Chamber of Commerce and Industry
(ZACCI). However, the influence and ability to petition government of both
organisations was limited due to the economic weakness of the private sector
and the government's ambivalent attitude towards business (Beveridge and
Oberschall 1979).The relationship between the state and business interests
was therefore mainly based on individual responses and networks;
businessmen remained UNIP members as it was easier to useparty-ties to
circumvent rules than to change the system. Thus, through a combination of
state protection and individual negotiations, the business community was split
into various individual entities acquiring profits within the state controlled
economy (Gertzel 1984). While weakas an organisational force, private
business increased its influence through large numbers of businessmen
6 Dr. K.J. Ngwisha, Director of the UNIP Research Bureau, cited in Rakner 1992: 97.
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becoming members of parliament in the 1970s (Baylies and Szeftel 1984). As a
result, private sector interests became expressed from within the party, which
again serve d to intensify the conflicts between socialist and capitalist oriented
members of the party.
Agricultural interests under ane party rule
Most accounts of Zambia's contemporary history relate the limited progress
in agricultural sector development to the emergence of a strong and vocal
urban interest lobby in the post colonial era (Gulhati 1989; Bates 1981).
However, the agricultural policies implemented after independence were also
based on rural policy objectives such as reducing the dominance of large sea le
commercial farmers, and an aim to ensure fairness, national unit y and
economic justiee (Sandberg 1990). In 1971, the government implemented a
system of uniform transregional crop-pricing with the intention of equalising
the market position of all ethnic and regional groups and to en sure fair and
adequate agricultural distribution. The national marketing arrangements
provided benefits to the widely dispersed peasant farming population in the
form of guaranteed prices, provisions for transport and storage. As the pan-
territorial pricing system was structured as a welfare provision for small scale
maize producers, the system serve d as a detriment to large scale commercial
farming (Makgetla 1994).
The dualism between the commercIal farming industry, largely consisting
of whites, and the vast majority of small peasant farmers also manifested itself
at the organisational leveL.. The two main organisations representing
agriculture until the political transition in 1991 werethe Commercial Farmers
Bureau (CFB), an association representing private, largely white expatriate
commercIal farmers, and the Zambia Co-operative Federation Unions (ZCF)
representing mainly small scale maize producers. UNIP's centralising
ambitions were perhaps best realised in the agricultural co-operative
movement, institutionalised in the Co-operative Act of 1970. In the fashion of
state corporatism, co-operatives were formed as a government policy, not on
the basis of member interests'. Furthermore, the co-operatives were affiliated
to UNIP and the legal framework allowed the government excessivepowers to
intervene in the daily operations of the co-operatives. The commercial
farmers' association, CFB, had only limited influence during Kaunda's reign
and the organisation's marginal role is illustrated by the fact that the Minister
of Agriculture in 1980 declared CFB obsolete and discarded in favour of the
government established ZCF.7 Nevertheless, as in the case of business
interests, government intervention in the rural economy was also received
positively by many Zambia n emerging rural producers and entrepreneurs who
saw opportunities of entering into rural trading and farming through the
exclusion of Asian and European producers. The policies of UNIP challenged
the dominance of expatriate farmers in the food economy and many emerging
Zambian entrepreneurs supported the policies of Zambianisation (Baylies and
Szeftel 1982). Similarly to the developments within the business sector,
commercial farming interests in Zambia split along a racial dimension where
7 The strength of the government vis à vis the organisation was further reflected in the
response by the CFB spokesperson who reserved comment on the statement by the Minister of
Agriculture (Sandberg 1990: 198).
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African farmers to a large extent sought to increase their interest through
UNIP membership. And while organised large scale agricultural interests were
marginalised, producers enjoyed personal benefits from the government.
Thus, the UNIP government utilised different sets of policies towards the
various sector interests. Yet at the individuallevel, a consensus formed around
the principles of modernisation and state led capitalism which captured both
business, farming and labour interests in the initial years after independence.
This state-corporatist set-up was founded on high returns from the
copperindustry. As argued by Callaghy, this 'cozy' relationship between UNIP
and societal interest groups was severely challenged by the economic decline
of the mid-1970s (Callaghy 1990).
Economic decline and political opposition
During the first ten years after independence in 1963, the Zambian economy
expanded fairly rapidly with GDP increasing at an average of 2.3 per cent
annually in real terms (World Bank 1984). However, Zambia's modest luck
ran out in 1974 and according to estimates, the country experienced a 30 per
cent decline in real per capita growth between 1975 and 1990. Among the
nations in sub-Saharan Africa, Zambia suffered one of the greatest and most
rapid economic declines starting in the early 1970s. The economic decline was
caused by a sharp fall in copper prices on the world market coinciding with
increasing prices of oil imports. The economic decline further coincided with
the implementation of the one-party state constitution.
The combined effects of a hostile world economy, internal mis-
management and regional conflicts represented a formidable challenge to
maintaining the consensus base toward the late 1970s. Despite the economic
decline, the high consumption patterns created during the first decade after
independence when income from copper was high, were not altered. The
UNIP government instead attempted to finanee trade deficits by foreign
borrowing. Zambia entered its first Stand-by Agreement with the IMF in
1976. But the austerity measures introduced between 1976 and 1989 all failed
to address the underlying structural weakness of the Zambian economy
related to a wasteful state sector and inefficient agricultural production
A large literature exists on Zambia's failure to implement structural
adjustment policies. The majority of these analyses have explained the reform
problems with reference to the strong resistance from the vocal trade union
movement (Akwetey 1994; Gibbon 1992; Callaghy 1990; Ncube et aL. 1987).
In the period after 1983 the structural adjustment measures dominated the
relationship between the trade unions and UNIP. Throughout the 1980s the
trade union movement was the most outspoken opponent of the IMF
measures. The trade union objected to the devaluation of the currency, the
decontrol of prices and the auetioning of the Kwatcha (Rakner 1993).
According to observers, reform implementation in Zambia was stalled under
the reign of UNIP government because the one-party regime lacked the
capacity to insulate itself from the demands of itsurban population (Bates and
Krueger 1993; Callaghy 1990; Hawkins 1991). Others have sought to explain
the failure of the economic restructuring measures with reference to the strong
opposition to reform found within the ruling party and its bureaucracy (Bates
and Collier 1993, Callaghy 1990). As both perspectives emphasise the
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ideological orientation of UNIP, they are not mutually exclusive. The UNIP
government, with its socialist orientation and ambitionsof nationalisation,
actively supported the creation of a strong and unified trade union movement.
Maintaining close ties to workers' organisations, combined with a
pronounced scepticism toward marked and export oriented economIc policies,
were important ingredients in UNIP's ideological orientation. Similarly, the
creation of farmers' co-operative units closely tie d to UNIP ensured a channel
of communication between the state and the small scale agricultural
producers. The ideological resistance to economic restructuring by African
policy-makers, bureaucrats and academics have large ly been ignored in the
literature on economic policy reform.8 However, it is important to note that in
the 1980s, neither top bureaucrats, trade unionists, nor politicians believed
that an outward economic orientation would result in growth. The inward
looking ISI strategy was justified by the fear of South Africa and the ideology
of the front line states. Moreover, the structuralist economic ideas were widely
supported by influential bilateral donors and development economists in the
Western world as well (Helleiner 1986). There were therefore few independent
sources in Zambia in the 1980s that had the capacity or inclination to
challenge the economic policies of UNIP (Bates and Collier 1993). However,
as the Zambia n economy continued to deteriorate throughout the 1980s, the
economic decline became the main mobilising factor against the one party
regime. Former opponents of economic reform now campaigned against
Kenneth Kaunda and UNIP on a ticket of economic liberalisation.
The transition to multiparty (ule
Archival sources demonstrate that ZCTU opposed the IFI initiated structural
adjustment programmes as late as 1989 (Rakner 1993). This factor has been
greatly overshadowed by the events that took place in 1990 when ZCTU and
the trade union movement broke the near 30 year old alliance with UNIP and
supported the Movement for Multiparty Democracy, advocating far more
market-oriented economic polices than UNIP. It is important to appreciate the
immensely felt need for change in the Zambian society and the Jaet that the
economic situation had deteriorated so drastically that the crisis was better
understood. It should also be emphasised that UNIP had already abandoned
its own New Economic Recovery Programme and a structural adjustment
programme had at least formally been in place since 1989. MMD was,
however, at no stage a labour party but a coalition of interests. Whereas the
main strength of the union was its organisational resources, the financial
strength of the business community and commercial farmers gave the se groups
considerable influence over MMD's policies.
In 1991 MMD facedthe challenge of institutionalising is own rule while
transforming an economy that had been showing signs of decline for two
decades. MMD also faced the same challenges UNIP had met at in dep endene e
three decades earlier as the main cluster of the opposition forces now forming
government were rooted in the developmentalist state model (White 1996).
MMD's main challenge was that the social forces that had organised the
transition to democracy were running the risk of being weakened by the
actions of the new regime. As the next section will ilustrate, at least in a short
8 I thank Nicolas van de Walle for bringing the issue of ideology to my attention.
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term perspective, the influence ofboth business interests, labour and farmers
over economic policies have declined as Zambia transformed from a system of
state corporatism to pluralism.
Part 4. Economic interest groups in the 1990s
The MMD government enjoyed a grace period in the period after the 1991
elections in the sense that its relationship to key economic interest groups was
characterised by a low level of confliet. Judging by the media coverage, level
of cIvic unrest and strike activity, The MMD government also enjoyed much
general support for its economic policies until the end of 1993.9 During Its
first years in office,a wide range of economic restructuring measures were
introduced, particularly in the area of macroeconomic stabilisation and
liberalisation of trade and exchange rates (Mulaisho, Rakner and van de
Walle 1999). In the initial years, interest associations representing labour,
business and agriculture were invited to represent sector interests on various
government committees. However, overall, the government did not attempt to
build consensus around the economic reform measures implemented through
extensive consultations with economic interest groups. The explicit attempt to
follow a 'honeymoon implementation strategy', in which controversial
reforms were implemented as soon as possible following the 1991 elections,
was confirmed by the Minister of Finanee at the time, Emmanuel Kasonde:
"I was lucky as prior to taking offce Chiluba had told me that I would be offered
the Ministry of Finance if we were to form a government. I therefore had a year in
which I followed economic events very closely and when we formed government
we were able to hit the road running in order to implement my ideas quickly. I was
also aware of MMD's popularity, if I had to make unpopular decisions it had to be
done during the honeymoon period; otherwise it would be very diffcult. In other
words, necessary but unpopular decisions had to be quick". 10
By late 1993 the effects of the various economic reforms, particularly the
combined effects of macroeconomIc stabilisation measures and financial and
agricultural liberalisation, began to effect large segments of the population. As
aresult, economic reforms were criticised from within the cabinet, parliament
and interest groups. Despite the increasingly stronger criticism appearing from
1994 onwards, the MMD government maintained the contentious agricultural
reforms. In light of Zambia's dismal record of discontinued policy agreements
with the international donors, and the fact the 1996 elections implied a test of
the government's popularity, the continuance of the reforms may be regarded
as aremarkable feature; all the more so because the reforms had brought no
9 A marked shift occurred in 1993, coinciding with the dismissal of some key Cabinet ministers
and the temporary reinstatement of state of emergency laws (Rakner 1998).io Personal communications, Emmanuel Kasonde. Lusaka October 7, 1996. The honeymoon
hypothesis suggests that political and economic liberalisation will move in a predictable
direction. Political liberalisation will lea d to greater pluralism, which is expected to create
problems for governments wishing to maintain economic reforms. But before thathappens, a
government is excepted to have a grace period, when the opposition is in disarray, enabling it
to undertake the diffcult economic reforms. As the grace period nears an end and the electoral
cycle heats up, the government is expected to rely on the support of the beneficiaries of
reform, while facing the losers of reform who have nOw become stronger (Rakner 1998).
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results in the form of growth so far. The decline of interest group influence in
the 1990s provides a partial explanation for this puzzle.
The influence of labour in the 19905
Labour was both considered the potentially most important political ally and
opponent to MMD due to its historical role as the main opposition force
under the former regime and because of its ties to MMD in the transition
phase. However, from the beginning, MMD adopted a policy of not
consulting with ZCTU. The trade union movement reacted to the effects of the
economic reforms, such as the removal of maize subsidies, from an early stage.
Nevertheless, the union maintained that the MMD government was a labour
government and allowed the MMD government a grace period in the first
years after the 1991 elections. The reforms implemented, which had resulted
in food riots during the 1980s, initially met little resistance from labour.
From 1994 onwards the trade union movement again became an
outspoken critic of the economic liberalisation proeess. When ZCTU
conducted a tour to the World Bank and IMF in Washington DC to plead for
more lenient benchmarks in late 1993, the governments re action ilustrated
that the government and the labour movement had vastly different perceptions
on what was to be the role of the trade union movement in a pluralist political
environment. The Minister of Labour argued that unions should stop acting
as a shadow government as in a democracy trade unions were only one of
many interest associations.ll An other example of how MMD deliberately has
used pluralism as an institutional mechanism to weaken the influence of the
trade union congress is the changes to the Industrial Relations Act. When
MMD came to power in 1991, the Industrial Relations Act of 1990 was
replaced and the policy of one-industry-one- union was reinstated (IR Act
1993). When ZCTU from 1994 onwards became more outspoken in its
criticism of MMD's policies, MMD declared its intention to abolish the one-
union-one-industry provision and, thus, end the ZCTU's and Zambia
Federation of Employers' (ZFE) organisational monopoly as the only legal
apex organisations.
However, the issue of privatisation created the most damaging conflict
between the ZCTU and the MMD government as well as within ZCTU. In
late 1994, intern al disagreement on the issue of privatisation split the
Zambian trade union movement. In contrast to the labour congress (ZCTU),
the Mine Workers Union (MUZ) at this time endorsed the plans for
privatising Zambia Consolidated Coppermines (ZCCM). Representing a
sector perceived to benefit from privatisation, the mineworkers advocated for
a speedy privatisation of the mines, arguing that despite potential retrench-
ments, the long term prospects of workers would be better with the mines in
private hànds.12 MUZ's president was also the vice-president of ZCTU and the
issue of privatisation therefore divided the trade union congress as welL. At the
ZCTU Quadrennial Congress in October 1994, the trade union congress split
11 The Minister of Labour Newstead Zimba (former General secretary ZCTU) quoted in Times
of Zambia, December 16, 1993.12 Mine Workers Union of Zambia (MUZ) (1994): "Zambia's agenda fordevelopment and the
option öf privatisation - the union's view" . Memo, MUZ Seeretariat, Kitwe.
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and five major unions left ZCTU.13 The trade union split was primarilya split
over economic policies. The splinter unions, predominantly representing the
private sector, claimed that ZCTU spent its resources on public sec tor workers
and ignored the plight of the workers in private sector .14 The split of the trade
union congress crippled the political influence of the labour movement as
union's now fought an internal battle over the influence of Zambia's workers.
The financial situation of ZCTU was also greatly affected as the five splinter
unions were among the largest unions. Losing 1/3 of its membership, 40 per
cent of its incomes and split on the issue of economIc liberalisation and the
rule of the governing party, ZCTU could not challenge the governments
economic policies, nor could it constitute a threat in terms of rallying behind
an opposition party in the 1996 elections.15 From its basis in the remaining
unions, predominately located in the public sector, ZCTU's bargaining
position vis-à-vis the government was greatly reduced. Comparing the position
of labour within the pluralist system it had fought so hard toattain to the
position it held within the one-party state a labour representative argued that:
"It is ironic that Chiluba managed what the Kaunda regime never did; to weaken
and split the trade union movement..ZCTU is weakened organisationally due
mainly to loss of membership. It does no longer enjoy the strength it used to....The
problem is that there now is a government that deliberately ignores the unions and
clips the strength of the unions". 16
Business interest in a Iiberalised environment
In the 1991 election campaign, MMD promised that they would return the
economy to the market and the private sector. The business sector was
envisioned to become more influentIal with a MMD government due both to
the strong presenee of businessmen in the new parliament and business'
marginalisation under the former regime's humanist-cum-socialist ideology.
Compared to the position of labour, it can be argued that the MMD
government responded with less repression to the views from the business
community, despite the strong criticism raised by business towards the
government's handling of political issues from 1995 onwards. Nevertheless,
viewing business - government relations in the 1990s it may be more accurate
to argue that government only to a limited extent has responded to business.
Business interests in Zambia have in the 1990s suffered from the
postponement of reforms in the public sector and the failure to privatise the
mining industry. Despite the pro business agenda of MMD, the anticipated
resurgence of private sector influence has not materialised. An important
explanation for the limited influence of business relates to business
13 Apart from the mineworkers, the building and engineering workers union (NUBEGW), the
commercial and industri al union (NUCIW), the financial workers union (ZUFIA W) and the
teachers union (ZNUT) left the ZCTU in 1994.14 Personal interviews; Times of Zambia, October 27, 1994.
15 Banda, Darlington and AustIn Muneku (1996): "The Impact of Structural Adjustment
Programmes on the Labour Market and Unionisation in Zambia". Kitwe and Lusaka:
ZCTU/Fredrich Ebert Stiftung.16 Personal communications, Robinson Sikazwe Regional Consultant, Norwegian Confedera-
ti on of Trade Unions, Lusaka November 28 1996.
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associations' thinness in terms of membership and membership density. The
Zambian business sector further lacks institutional capacity to maintain a
measurable pressure on the government. Echoing findings from comparative
analyses, the Zambian business sector has further been undermined by its
inability to put up a unified support or opposition to the economic reform
measures (Moore and Hamalai 1993). The Zambian business sector has been
split between the trading and the manufacturing sectors with the latter being
dependent upon the imports and sales on a home-market. As argued by the
President of Zambia Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI):
"Some of our business members think that liberalisation has gone too far as some
businesses have suffered. There are a number of businesses in this country which
due to liberalisation have not been able to compete. It is, however, a question of
approach. As a federation we do not adopt a one voice approach".17
The ambivalent responses from business also brought forth a ra cia L division
reminiscent of findings in Zimbabwe (Taylor 1999). Black businessmen have
increasingly found themselves unable to participate in the proeess of buying
enterprise and subsequently, they have criticised the proeess for primarily
enriching whites (and foreign companies). From 1995 onwards, the business
community's position towards the MMD government changed markedly. The
MMD governments wilingness to con sult and co-operate with associations
representing business interests diminished as the party begun to consolidate its
powerbase from late 1994 onwards. The absenee of coalition building efforts
may be explained by the fact that the few groups that appeared as winners of
the economic reforms could not provide useful support to the government as
they mainly were white and Asian businessmen. Thus, the effects of political
pluralism with respect to business echoes the experiences of labour: With the
private sector constituting less than 20 per cent of formal sector employment,
private business did not constitute an electoral threat, nor auseful political
ally, for MMD.
Agricultural interests under MMD rule
In Zambia, as in Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, both academic scholars and
donors expected agricultural producers to benefit from economic reforms. But
the experiences from Zambia indicate that agricultural liberalisation has been
a contentious aspect of the economic restructuring programme.Furthermore,
the dualism in Zambian agriculture has hindered agricultural producers from
lobbying the government in a coherent fashion.
The MMD government withdrew from maize mark eting and production
in 1993/94. As a consequence of mark et liberalisation taking place
simultaneously with macroeconomIc stabilisation, the newly emerging
agricultural trade sector faced a harsh financial environment. The problems
encountered in the proeess of liberalising agricultural production greatly
undermined the confidence in the economic reform programme overall
(Mulaisho, Rakner and van de Walle 1999). However, due to the conflieting
needs and perceptions of the large majority of small sea le peasant producers
and the small group of commercial farmers, no coherent agricultural lobby
17 Personal communications i. Chamwera, President of ZACCI. Lusaka, October 14, 1996.
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formed which could challenge the reform measures. For the large group of
peasant farmers, subsidised maize production had come to be regarded as a
social welfare mechanism. The liberalisation carried out from 1993 onwards
therefore had stark social consequences. However, poor infrastrueture
combined with an atomistic peasantry meant that the organisational basis for
a peasant voice was weak. When agricultural liberalisation was announced
prior to the 93/94 season, all government resources were withdrawn from the
co-operatives and the Zambia Co-operative Federation (ZCF) was left to
generate its own funding. Throughout the 1990s, MMD deliberately ignored
working through the ZCF as the co-operatives were considered part of the
UNIP organisational infrastrueture. In addition to ZCF, three new
associations representing small scale and emergent farmers have emerged after
1991. However, neither the Peasant Farmers Union of Zambia (PFUZ), the
National Association of Peasant and Small Sea le Farmers Union of Zambia
(NAPSSFU), nor Women in Agriculture represent large segments of the
agricultural producers.
Contrary to small scale farming interests, commercial farmers had
favoured agricultural liberalisation in the Second Republic and this group of
agricultural producers was expected to be a major beneficiary of theMMD
government's policies. The ZNFU, representing the commercial farmers,
successfully lobbied the MMD government to remove almost all agricultural
products from the free tradeagreement with Zimbabwe in 1996. However,
generally the capacityof farmers to lobby the government on behalf of its
members have been limited throughout the Third Republic. ZNFU with its
app. 350 members could not be regarded as an encompassing association. The
statement by the Minister of Agriculture between 1993 and 1996, Simon
Zukas clearly ilustrates the limited political weight attributed to ZNFU by the
MMD government:
"The organisations like ZNFU have a contradictory agenda. And nothing we could
do would be right for them. As a result, I did not work with them. I saw my role as
getting the policy going. I did not have to work with these guys as the commercIal
farmers vote does not carry very much"'8 .
In order to increase its lobbying capacity, ZNFU sought to bring small scale
farmers into the association. However, including agricultural producers
outside the ranks of the large commercial farmers meant that a great varietyof
views were brought into the organisation. This dilemma was illustrated by the
many conflicting statements offered on the issue of agricultural liberalisation.
More than any other sector in Zambia, agriculture underscores the barriers
against generating political support bases around economic policy reforms in
AfrIca (Herbst 1993). No agricultural organisations couldprovide an electoral
support-base for MMD. Due to the weakness of agricultural associations,
arguably, the opposition to agricultural policies were primarily voiced by
populist sources like the press and MP's representing rural constituencies.
18 Personal interview, Simon Zukas, Minister of Agriculture 1993-1996, Lusaka December 13,
1996.
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The 1996 general elections
By 1996 35 parties were registered in Zambia with the intention of contesting
the 1996 parliamentary and presidential elections. Out of this large number
only seven could be considered proper party organisations in the sense of
providing a party manifesto. Of this group, only UNIP could claim to have a
party machinery at the grass root leve!. Ilustrating the narrow social and
political basis of the opposition parties, apart from UNIP, the most prominent
opposition parties were headed by individuals who had been elected to
parliament on a MMD ticket in 199119. The limited social and political base
of the Zambian party 'flora' was further reflected in the party manifestos as
few major differences could be detected. All the major parties stated that they
were in favour of continued economic liberalisation. All parties further lent
their support to privatisation.20 Thus, the political opposition operated within
a limited political and ideological space which may explain why most
Zambian interest associations, while critical of the economic reform proeess
and MMD, did not endorse an alternative party in the 1996 elections.21
Despite the lack of economic growth and with no sectors of the economy
appearing a winners of the reform measures implemented, the MMD
government was not faced with a political movement seriously challenging its
popularity in the 1996 elections. No party or politician lobbied for a return of
the controlled exchange regime or protection of local industry. As such, the
1996 elections represented a significant departure from Zambian policy
debates in the 1980s when opposition to the various structural adjustment
programmes centred aroundthe desirability of reform programmes. Now
halfway through the second electoral cycle of the Third Republic, there are
few signs indicating that radical changes can be expected in the national
election announced for 2001. The weakness of interest aggregation is stil a
significant feature of Zambian polities. Despite continuos economic decline,
an economic reform agreementhas been maintained with the International
Finanee Institutions. The public debates are dominated by various Non
Governmental Organisations and focused on issues related to human rights
violations. As aresult, paradoxically, the political space for interest
aggregation has narrowed with the reintroduction of pluralism to Zambian
polities.
5. Conclusion
Pluralis t theory posits that interest groups will enhance their political influence
within a multi part y system characterised by free and fair elections, freedom of
speech and association. Contrary to expectations, this paper has argued that
in Zambia the influence of interest associations representing key sectors of the
economy has declined with the introduction of political liberalisation in 1991.
In each case, the unions, farmers and business associations have had to adjust
to the transition of the regime from state corporatism to a form of pluralism.
Yet, the circumstances around their reduced political influence have been
19 UNIP boycotted the 1996 national elections as a result of the constitutional amendment
which denied Kenneth Kaunda the right to contest the 1996 Presidential elections.20 While committed to privatisation theUNIP Manifesto state that the mines (ZCCM) should
only be partially privatised and instead reorganised. (UNIP: 1996: 19)21 Apartfrom Zambia National Farmers Union (ZNFU) who openly supported the Lima party.
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unique to each sector. Chiluba's trade union background provided the MMD
government with initial support and extensive knowledge of the trade union
movement which enabled MMD to capita lise on the splitbetween private and
public sector unions. The fundamental division between industrialists and
traders weakened the potential political influence of the main business
association, ZACCI. The problems of agricultural liberalisation and the
dualism of the agricultural sector interests in Zambia rendered an agricultural
lobby weak and ineffectuaL.
The Zambian experiences with simultaneous political and economic
liberalisation point to a serious flaw in the reform literature which, on the
basis of pluralist thinking, assumes that certain groups wil emerge as reform
'winners' and others as 'losers'. Firstly, as groups considered, neither Zambian
business, labour nor agricultural interests can be considered (or indeed,
consider themselves) as winners of reform.While some reform measures may
have benefited a sector as a whole, other measures have hurt some sectoral
interests and benefited others. As a result, no sector has emerged that can be
characterised as new constituencies in favour of the economic reform policies.
Secondly, the racial dimension challenges the expectation that reform winners
can become political constituencies for the government. In Zambia the groups
that, so far, have benefited most from the reforms implemented since the early
1990s are the politically least useful; Asian and white farmers . and business
owners who are few in numbers and historically favoured by the former
colonial policies. Thirdly, in order for economic interest associations to be
able to influence policies as envisioned in the pluralist notion of 'winners' and
'losers', the political arena must provide channels in which interests can be
aggregated into the competitive political proeesses. Interestingly, so far no
links have been formed between the economic interests and the political party
system. Party formation and politics have centred around issues of
personalities, individual ambitions and ethnic relations and oppositionparties
are exceedingly weak. No party offered an economic agenda challenging
MMD's economic reforms and, as a result, the interest groups representing
business, labour and agriculture have so far had few actual channels into the
political arena.
The Zambia n case study supports the conclusion reached by, among others,
Bratton and van de Walle in finding that pre-existing aspectsof political
culture were not challenged by the political or economic reforms (Bratton and
van de Walle 1997). By questioning the assumption that political liberalisation
wil enhance the position and influence of economic interest groups this paper
further ties with an emerging literature arguing that interest groups have not
played a determinant ro le in undermining economic reforms. This literature
has tended to dismiss the focus on interest groups and argue that in general,
the interest gro up perspective has overstated the role of associational groups
in Third World countries. This paper deviates from this position by arguing
that in the case of Zambia, paradoxically, interest groups had some real
influence under the former one-party structures and that this influence has
been reduced as a result of the combined proeesses of political and economic
liberalisation.
While pluralism in Zambia has challenged the state corporatist ties
between the government and certain interest associations, the political
openings have so far not provided interest associations with new channels into
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the political system. As aresult, their influence has declined as these interest
groups had better channels into the one-party state of UNIP. That interest
associations, formerly 'pampered' and protected by state corporatist
arrangement have lost influence with the introduction of political
liberalisation may not sound alarming to those concerned with the democratIc
development in Africa. Some may even argue that the proliferation of interest
associations and an expansion of views being expressed in society is indeed
one of the potential merits of democracy. The problem is, however, that
nothing has come in the place of the former powerful trade union movement
or the weak, yet existing, welfare services provided by the locallevel branches
of the co-operative farmers organisation. ZCTU serve d as the central non
governmental check on the powers of UNIP throughout the 1980s. In the
1990s, two local elections and one national election has proved that despite
36 listed parties and around 400 non governmental associations, presently no
organisation in Zambia is capable of contesting MMDs power. As aresult,
pluralism, and with it institutional proliferation, has increased the autonomy
of MMD from society. MMD do not have linkages to any economic interest
groups. Ironically, so far it has not been necessary to create constituencies of
support from interest associations representing the main sectors of the
economy. Thus, contrary to the assumptions in pluralist theory, the Zambian
case suggests that the neo patrimonial practices associated with one-party rule
may prevail within formal structures of democracy and a market economy.
This political effect of Africa's partial political and economic reform proeesses
has so far not been adequately accounted for in the democratie literature.
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